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ABSTRACT
This paper explores the blurred conceptual boundaries between ‘practice/
treatment’, ‘research’ and ‘medical innovation’ in order to inform what these
mean – and can mean – for regulation of these fields of enquiry. These terms
are constantly employed within the sphere of health and human health
research regulation, but there is a lack of clarity and consistency in the ways
in which the activities are categorised. This gives rise to confusion and can
negatively impact treatment/research and innovation. I argue that it is not
only timely but also necessary to revisit our current conceptualisations of
these key activities, with a particular emphasis on medical innovation. The
proposal is to reimagine regulatory landscapes – including regulation – in
more holistic terms that reflect the processes that transgress these categories
and to understand better the blurred boundaries that exist between them. I
suggest that the anthropological concept of liminality is particularly helpful in
developing more holistic understandings of medical innovation that reflect
the processes and relationships that exist. Importantly, it provides us with a
new conceptualisation of medical innovation as a shared space where both
practice/treatment and research can co-exist.
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 13 November 2018; Accepted 3 January 2019
KEYWORDS Research; treatment; innovation; health research; regulation
1. Introduction
In 1979, pioneering health law academic Bernard Dickens noted:
A medical profession which did not seek improved means to conquer disease
would be condemned for dereliction of its duty. Members of the public will
not accept the current state of the medical arts as finite but feel justified in
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expecting the development of more effective therapies for illness, and the pro-
motion of improved means of preventive care.1
Four decades later, for some 10,000 known health problems, we currently only
possess around 500 viable treatments.2 It could be argued that the pressures to
provide treatment, conduct research and innovate not only remain, but are stron-
ger than ever. Technological developments have increased our understanding of
disease, and there has been a marked growth in public awareness of, and engage-
ment with, health related issues.3 For example, social media is emerging as an
avenue through which patients may even seek to participate in research and
access experimental therapies, often under expanded access4/ compassionate
use programmes.5 This comes hand in hand with a swathe of ‘Right to Try’ legis-
lation adopted acrossmanyUnited States jurisdictions.6 In theUK, proponents of
the Medical Innovation Bill (the Saatchi Bill), which provoked lively debate,7
argued that innovation was stifled due to the current regulatory landscape.
In the public health sphere, the West-African Ebola and Zika viruses have
highlighted the ongoing need to rapidly develop novel therapies where
effective cures do not already exist. Numerous initiatives are under way in
order to decrease the time lag between identification of public health emergen-
cies and availability of effective treatments via research and innovation.8 For
example, the UK government has partnered with Innovate UK in investing
£35 million towards the development of new vaccines for diseases of epidemic
potential9 and policy pushes towards innovation appear in other translational
1Bernard Dickens, ‘Human Rights in Medical Experimentation’ (1979) 9(23) Israel Yearbook on Human
Rights 23.
2UK Department of Health, ‘Accelerated Access Review: Final Report Review of innovative medicines and
medical technologies’ (October 2016) www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/565072/AAR_final.pdf p10 (this and all other links in this article were last accessed on 28
August 2018).
3The Lancet Neurology (Editorial), ‘Increasing the Power of Public Awareness Campaigns’ (2015) 14(7) The
Lancet Neurology 669.
4Jonathan Darrow and others, ‘Practical, Legal, and Ethical Issues in Expanded Access to Investigational
Drugs’ (2015) 372 New England Journal of Medicine 279.
5Tim Mackey and Virginia Schoenfeld, ‘Going “Social” to Access Experimental and Potentially Life-Saving
Treatment: An Assessment of the Policy and Online Patient Advocacy Environment for Expanded Access’
(2016) 14 BMC Medicine 17; Arthur Caplan and Kenneth Moch, ‘Rescue Me: The Challenge of Compas-
sionate Use in the Social Media Era’ (2014) Bethesda Health Affairs Blog http://healthaffairs.org/blog/
2014/08/27/rescue-me-the-challenge-of-compassionate-use-in-the-social-media-era/.
6Denise Meyerson, ‘Medical Negligence Determinations, the “Right to Try,” and Expanded Access to Inno-
vative Treatments’ (2017) 14(3) Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 385; David Vulcano, ‘The Regulatory Debate
around Pre-approval Product Access’ (2017) 26(4) Applied Clinical Trials 30.
7José Miola, ‘Bye-Bye Bolitho? The Curious Case of the Medical Innovation Bill’ (2015) 15 (2–3) Medical Law
International 124; José Miola and Nils Hoppe, ‘Innovation in Medicine Through Degeneration in Law? A
Critical Perspective on the Medical Innovation Bill’ (2014) 14(4) Medical Law International 266; Bernad-
ette Richards, ‘Medical Innovation Laws: An Unnecessary Innovation’ (2015) 40(3) Australian Health
Review 282.
8World Health Organization, ‘Progress Report on the Development of the WHO Health Emergencies Pro-
gramme’ (2016) www.who.int/about/who_reform/emergency-capacities/who-health-emergencies-
programmeprogress-report-march-2016.pdf.
9Gov.UK, ‘SBRI Funding Competition: Vaccines for Global Epidemics’ (8 November 2016) www.gov.uk/
government/publications/sbri-funding-competition-vaccines-for-global-epidemics-clinical.
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fields such as regenerative medicine.10 The recently formed Accelerated Access
Collaborative11 was introduced in order to streamline and speed up patient
access to innovations. Considerable economic commitments towards boosting
innovation are also afoot at the European level12 and the Commission’s strategy
for Responsible Research and Innovation is noteworthy.13
However, alongside the drive for health improvement through innovation
come significant challenges calling into question the efficacy of pre-existing
regulatory approaches. This article considers some ways in which current
conceptualisations of medical innovation are problematic. I suggest this is
so not only due to ambiguities surrounding what might constitute medical
innovation, but also due to the blurred, overlapping boundaries existing
between medical innovation, practice/treatment, and research. It is my
claim that existing conceptualisations fail to adequately account for many
of the nuances, diverse processes and experiences associated with the activi-
ties. A more holistic account of medical innovation – and related activities
– is much needed. The building blocks of such an account are a processual
approach to regulation, examining regulatory spaces and experiences of
actors and relying upon the anthropological concept of liminality.14
Examples included in the discussion will highlight the pressing need to
achieve conceptual clarity in our regulatory characterisations. Paradoxically,
this clarity might be achieved not necessarily through further categorisation
of activities – which can represent a typical regulatory response towards
areas of uncertainty,15 but rather, through collapsing distinctions and explor-
ing grey areas of overlap. One example is the learning healthcare system, an
environment in which ‘knowledge generation is so embedded into the core
of the practice of medicine that it is a natural outgrowth and product of the
healthcare delivery process and leads to continual improvement in care’.16
The increasing prevalence of such systems demonstrates growing difficulty
10Etienne Vignola-Gagné, Peter Biegelbauer and Daniel Lehner, ‘Translational Research: Entrepreneurship,
Advocacy and Programmatic Work in the Governance of Biomedical Innovation’ in S. Borrás and J. Edler
(eds), The Governance of Socio-Technical Systems. Explaining Change (Edward Elgar Publishing 2014) 132;
John Gardner and Andrew Webster, ‘The Social Management of Biomedical Novelty: Facilitating Trans-
lation in Regenerative Medicine’ (2016) 156 Social Science & Medicine 90; NHS England www.england.
nhs.uk/ourwork/innovation/test-beds/.
11See Accelerated Access Collaborative: www.nice.org.uk/aac.
12See Innovative Medicines Initiative: www.imi.europa.eu/; European Institute of Innovation and Technol-
ogy, Innovation Communities: https://eit.europa.eu/activities/innovation-communities.
13European Commission, Responsible Research and Innovation (2012): http://ec.europa.eu/research/
science-society/document_library/pdf_06/responsible-research-and-innovation-leaflet_en.pdf.
14Graeme Laurie, ‘Liminality and the Limits of the Law in Health Research Regulation’ (2016) 25(1) Medical
Law Review 47; Samuel Taylor-Alexander and others, ‘Beyond Regulatory Compression: Confronting the
Liminal Spaces of Health Research Regulation’ (2016) 8(2) Law, Innovation and Technology 149, 175.
15Nayha Sethi and others, Liminal Spaces Workshop: Regulating for Uncertainty. 1-2 February 2018, Well-
come, London.
16Institute of Medicine, Roundtable on Evidence-Based Medicine, LeighAnne Olsen, Dara Aisner and
Michael McGinnis (eds), The Learning Healthcare System: Workshop Summary (National Academies
Press 2007) 6.
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in distinguishing between processes respectively categorised as ‘practice/treat-
ment’ on one hand and ‘research’ on the other.17 Identifying the most appropri-
ate level of ethical oversight becomes challenging and confusion can be
exacerbated by the duality of (potentially conflicting) roles played by different
actors in the healthcare setting such as the ‘clinician-investigator’ and the
‘patient-participant’. The Access to Medical Treatments (Innovation) Act
2016 and, in particular, proposals to establish a register for innovative treatments
are also considered. The register provides a clear example of how a liminal
approach might help us to better navigate areas where roles and activities are
overlapping. The recent scandal involving thoracic surgeon Paolo Macchiarini
and his ‘fatal experiments’18 is also discussed. One of the key findings from
an inquiry into the operations, discussed below, was that there was difficulty
in determining whetherMacchiarini and his teams’ activities represented clinical
care or research.19 Further, ‘medical innovation’, despite its pervasiveness within
the health setting, remains ill-defined; its relationship to, and differentiation
from, practice/treatment and research remains obscure, and in need of further
unpacking. The intention here is not to provide a thorough analysis of the
various and diverse definitions of medical innovation (and relatedly, practice/
treatment and research). Nor is it to advance specific suggestions as to regulatory
mechanisms which ought to be employed for the regulation of medical inno-
vation. Rather, through brief consideration of these activities and the use of
several examples, the discussion sheds light on why we need to, and how we
might, develop a richer, more holistic conceptualisation of medical innovation
and related activities. This is important because before we can determine
whether we are using the most appropriate regulatory approaches to govern
activities, we first need to ensure that we understand the nature of the activities
which we seek to regulate.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. I provide an overview
of typical conceptualisations of practice/treatment and research (Part 2) and
medical innovation (Part 3) and the regulatory frameworks that each engage;
such an overview demonstrates that the boundaries between these activities
are blurred, and that regulation needs to better acknowledge this. Part 4
argues that the anthropological concept of liminality is of value in developing
a more holistic approach towards conceptualising these activities. Such con-
ceptualisation better accounts for the grey areas of overlap between
17Nancy Kass and others, ‘The Research-Treatment Distinction: A Problematic Approach for Determining
Which Activities Should Have Ethical Oversight’ (2013) 43(1) Hastings Center Report Special Report 4.
https://doi.org/10.1002/hast.134.
18Bosse Linquevist documentary ‘The Experiments’ www.svt.se/dokument-inifran/experimenten-in-
english/ aired in the UK by the BBC as ‘Fatal Experiments: Downfall of a Surgeon’: www.bbc.co.uk/
programmes/b080k2z4.
19Kjell Asplund, ‘Macchiarini Fallet Investigation of the Activities of Transplantation of Synthetic Trachea
Karolinska University Hospital Report’ (31 August 2016) [14]. www.circare.org/info/pm/fallet-macch-
google-20160903.pdf.
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practice/treatment and research and the processes and experiences associated
with them, and thus might contribute towards improved regulation of these
activities.
2. Current conceptualisations and blurring boundaries between
practice/treatment and research
Although the primary focus of this article is on medical innovation, it is
necessary initially to consider conceptualisations of practice/treatment and
research for two reasons. First, a significant underappreciated point is that
medical innovation is inextricably linked to those activities typically charac-
terised as practice/treatment and research, to the extent that it may not be
clear where one activity ends and the other begins. Thus, in order to better
understand medical innovation and the associated regulatory challenges, we
must also consider practice/treatment and research. Secondly, the long-
noted problematics of the distinction between practice/treatment and
research can helpfully be contrasted with the further complexities which
medical innovation brings to the regulatory sphere. For the purposes of this
article, the terms ‘practice’ and ‘treatment’ are used synonymously and
referred to as ‘practice/treatment’. Whilst it is acknowledged that nuances
between ‘practice’ and ‘treatment’ might exist,20 for present purposes it is
sufficient to contrast practice/treatment together, with research and
innovation.
It is well established that the traditional locus of the distinction between
practice/treatment and research centres on the intention and design of an
activity. Whilst the Belmont Report is better known in the US as a founda-
tional document which advances ethical principles for biomedical research,
it also provides definitions of medical practice as:21
interventions that are designed solely to enhance the wellbeing of an individual
patient or client and that have a reasonable expectation of success. The purpose
of medical or behavioral practice is to provide diagnosis, preventive treatment
or therapy to particular individuals.22
In contrast, ‘research’:
designates an activity designed to test an hypothesis, permit conclusions to be
drawn, and thereby to develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge
(expressed, for example, in theories, principles, and statements of relation-
20Medical practice may refer to all that it entails to be a medical professional whereas treatment may be
construed to refer to the specific administering of treatment to an individual.
21Based in part on the distinctions offered by Robert Levine, ‘The Boundaries Between Biomedical or
Behavioral Research and the Accepted and Routine Practice of Medicine’ The Belmont Report, Appendix
(1978) Volume 1, DHEW Pub. No. (OS) 78-0013, U.S. Printing Office).
22National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research,
Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of Research (1978).
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ships). Research is usually described in a formal protocol that sets forth an
objective and a set of procedures designed to reach that objective.23
Thus, the primary intent in practice/treatment is to provide benefit to the
individual patient, whereas research aims to contribute to the stock of gener-
alisable knowledge, normally through adherence to a research protocol. But
even the authors of the Belmont Report acknowledged explicitly within the
Report, drafted forty years ago, the difficulty in differentiating between
these activities, ‘partly because both often occur together’.24 Despite this rec-
ognition of overlap, these definitions and the basis for distinction between
practice/treatment and research have been widely replicated, and continue
to persist across health research regulation.25 Let us briefly consider how prac-
tice/treatment and research are broadly regulated in the UK.26
A substantial body of case law exists around the standard of care expected
from doctors within the traditional doctor-patient relationship. In short, such
determinations generally turn on failure on the part of a doctor to act ‘in
accordance with a practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of
medical men skilled in that particular art’.27 This is one of the elements
that could lead to a civil claim against a doctor in medical negligence, or
indeed, in the most serious cases, to a criminal charge of gross negligence
manslaughter where a patient subsequently dies. Various considerations
will impact on standard treatment, including current guidance from the
Royal Colleges.28 The National Institute for Health Care and Clinical Excel-
lence (NICE) is charged with providing recommendations and guidance on
which treatments ought to be provided to patients through the NHS.29
Doctors can consult this guidance and exercise their judgement around
whether to prescribe treatments to a patient. All doctors in the UK must be
registered with the General Medical Council (GMC), the statutory regulator
for doctors in the UK, regardless of the setting in which they work. Doctors
must use their professional judgment to adhere to ethical guidance provided
by the GMC,, including ‘Good Medical Practice’, which sets out the pro-
fessional values, knowledge, skills and behaviours expected of all doctors
23Ibid.
24Ibid at Part A.
25For example, World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki (2013); Council for International Organ-
izations of Medical Research, International Ethical Guidelines for Health-related Research Involving
Humans (2016); Walker-Smith v GMC [2012] EWHC 503 (Admin). Whilst the court acknowledged the
grey area between practice and research, part of the test it put forward for determining whether the
professional was guilty of misconduct centred on whether his intention was to benefit the patient or
to ‘add to the stock of knowledge’.
26A comprehensive overview is provided by Jean McHale in this special issue.
27Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582.
28Academy of Medical Royal Colleges: www.aomrc.org.uk/
29NHS, ‘Can I Demand a Specific Treatment?’ www.nhs.uk/common-health-questions/nhs-services-and-
treatments/can-i-demand-a-specific-treatment/.
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working in the UK.30 Where concerns are raised about a doctor’s conduct, the
GMC has the power to investigate these and may refer cases to its adjudicatory
arm – the Medical Practitioners Tribunal Service – which can impose restric-
tions on a doctor’s ability to practise.
In contrast, researchers wishing to conduct studies involving human partici-
pants are, by the earlier definition, seeking to advance knowledge, rather than
apply standard treatments to patients on an individual basis. Permissions must
be sought before this is carried out, such as ethical approval(s).31 Depending on
the type of research in question, approvals must be sought from a Research
Ethics Committee. Additional approvals may be required from the relevant
regulatory authority. For example, for health and social care studies involving
the NHS (and being led in England), approval must be sought from the Health
Research Authority.32 The Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory
Agency is responsible for regulating medicines and medical devices in the
UK, including approving clinical trials, and providing market authorisation
and licences for pharmaceuticals.33 In turn, each type of research engages
various European regulations.34 Whilst regulation of research will depend
upon the type of research engaged, there is no overarching statutory regulation
of research in the UK. As such, the relevant research organisations are nor-
mally charged with investigating claims of scientific misconduct, the UK
Research Integrity Office plays an advisory role in such investigations.
The regulation of practice/treatment v research may appear sufficiently dis-
tinctive so as to imply that discerning between them is relatively straightfor-
ward. But numerous areas of regulatory overlap exist. For example, the GMC
is responsible for regulating doctors by virtue of their profession, regardless of
whether they are carrying out medical practice/treatment or research.35 The
Human Tissue Authority regulates those organisations which remove, store
and use human tissue for research as well as for treatment. Further, techno-
logical developments in how medicine is practised, treatments offered, and
research conducted, mean it may be harder than ever to delineate between
the activities and to determine important regulatory considerations. These
include: determining which activities should be subject to ethical oversight,
which level of oversight and by whom; questions of legal liability; what stan-
dard of care actions might be judged against; and what can be done with infor-
mation gathered in the course of the practice/treatment or research. The
‘learning healthcare system’ draws practice/treatment and research closer
together ‘by building knowledge development and application into each
30GMC Ethical Guidance: www.gmc-uk.org/ethical-guidance.




34For example the EU Clinical Trials Directive 2001/20/EC.
35See for example Walker-Smith (n 25).
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stage of the healthcare delivery process’.36 Kass and others note that these
‘deliberately integrated’ systems lead to increasingly blurred distinctions
between practice/treatment and research. A regulatory consequence is that
this leads to ‘overprotection of the rights and interest of patients in some
cases and to underprotection in others’.37 For example, patients may be
exposed to significant risks in clinical practice/treatment via interventions
of unproven clinical benefit and risk, performed by emergency surgical
teams who have never or only rarely performed a procedure whereas low-
minimal risk observational studies (research) must undergo prior ethical
review.38 Challenges are also prevalent in the public health emergency
setting where overlap is especially pronounced between activities focused
on treating individuals and those aimed at rapidly conducting research in
order to develop novel treatments. An on-going theme is the mismatch
between frameworks governing public health research and treatment.39
Again, regulatory challenges exist despite the important implications which
each classification can have in terms of whether activities necessitate ethics
review.40 In the emergency setting, the only potential ‘treatment’ option avail-
able may be through participation in trials which are ultimately designed to
generate generalisable knowledge and where participants may not necessarily
be assigned the investigative agent, but may be assigned to a control arm.
Indeed, identifying and obtaining appropriate ethics approval for experimen-
tal vaccines during the Ebola epidemic proved problematic, leading to sub-
stantial delays when timely response was crucial. 41
Another example can be found in the context of genomics. Due to the gap
in translation between (1) early adoption of technologies in the research
setting and (2) their implementation in the clinical care setting, it has been
suggested ‘clinical-esque’ obligations have become incumbent upon
genomic researchers. Questions arise around potential responsibilities to
report incidental findings which are ‘discovered in the course of research
that are beyond the aims of the study’.42 All of these concerns can impact
the standard of care potentially owed to patients/research participants and
give rise to uncertainty on the part of clinicians/researchers with regards to
36Olsen (n 16).
37Kass and others (n 17) s5.
38Ibid.
39Nuffield Council on Bioethics, ‘Conducting Research and Innovation During Global Health Emergencies:
What are the Ethical Challenges?’ Notes of workshop held on 9 December 2016: London http://
nuffieldbioethics.org/wp-content/uploads/Research-in-GHEs-note-for-web.pdf.
40Philippe Calain and others, ‘Research Ethics and International Epidemic Response: The Case of Ebola and
Marburg Haemorrhagic Fevers’ (2009) 2(1) Public Health Ethics 7.
41For related discussion see Gerard Keusch and others (eds), Integrating Clinical Research into Epidemic
Response: The Ebola Experience. Report from the National Academy of Sciences (National Academic
Press 2017).
42See for example Susan Wolf and others, ‘Managing Incidental Findings in Human Subjects Research
Analysis and Recommendations’ (2008) 36(2) The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 219.
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the nature and scope of these potential obligations.43 Numerous additional
examples of the challenges and blurring boundaries between practice/treat-
ment and research are prevalent across a wide range of settings.44 And, as con-
sidered next, ‘innovation’ adds further complexity.
3. Further complexities: medical innovation
Innovation gives rise to varying definitions;45 this is surprising given: the fre-
quency with which the term is used; the considerable commercial investments
towards boosting innovation;46 and the commitment towards understanding
how we can foster ‘responsible research and innovation’.47 On the other hand,
this ambiguity is not surprising given the inherent open texture of language48
and the variety of different settings (e.g. health, finance, agriculture) in which
innovation occurs.49 Butenko and Larouche propose three common elements
of innovation: ‘(i) an invention (ii) which is diffused and adopted and (iii)
which has a positive social impact’50 (albeit that there is also potential for
negative impact).51 In turn, each of these components is subject to varying
interpretation on, for example: what constitutes an invention (including
what level of ‘newness’ is required); what constitutes diffusion and adoption
and what constitutes a positive social impact. Further, and of particular sig-
nificance to the discussions which will follow, it has been stressed that (iv)
innovation may also be conceptualised as a process52 not just a product.
Moving to innovation in the medical context, diverse conceptualisations of
medical innovation are present, again, despite the frequency with which the
43Benjamin Berkman, Sara Chandros Hull and Lisa Eckstein, ‘The Unintended Implications of Blurring the
Line Between Research and Clinical Care in a Genomic Age’ (2014) 11(3) Personalized Medicine 28.
44See for example: John Kenyon Mason and Graeme Laurie, Mason and McCall Smith’s Law and Medical
Ethics (Oxford University Press, 10th edn 2016); Phoebe Friesen and others, ‘Rethinking the Belmont
Report?’ (2017) 17(7) American Journal of Bioethics 15; Shimon Tashiro, ‘Research, Practice, and Innova-
tive Therapy: On the Theoretical Model of Robert J. Levine’ (2010) 2(3) Asian Bioethics Review 229.
45See: Anahita Baregheh, Jennifer Rowley and Sally Sambrook, ‘Towards a Multidisciplinary Definition of
Innovation’ (2009) 47(8) Management Decision 1323.
46Hilary Sutcliffe, ‘A Report on Responsible Research and Innovation’ (2011) https://ec.europa.eu/research/
science-society/document_library/pdf_06/rri-report-hilary-sutcliffe_en.pdf.
47Ibid.
48Herbert Hart, The Concept of Law, Penelope Bulloch and Joseph Raz (eds), (Clarendon Press, 2nd edn
1994).
49Jeffrey Aronson ‘Something New Every Day Defining Innovation and Innovativeness in Drug Therapy’
(2008) 31(1) The Journal of Ambulatory Care Management 65; Kathleen Garnett, Geert Van Calster and
Leonie Reins ‘Towards an Innovation Principle: An Industry Trump or Shortening the Odds on Environ-
ment’ (2018) Law, Innovation and Technology online first DOI: 10.1080/17579961.2018.1455023; Anna
Butenko and Pierre Larouche ‘Regulating for Innovativeness or Regulation of Innovation?’ (2015) 7(1)
Law, Innovation and Technology 52.
50Butenko and Larouche ibid.
51Aronson (n 49); Robert Edgell and Roland Vogl, ‘A Theory of Innovation: Benefit, Harm, and Legal
Regimes’ (2015) 5(1) Law, Innovation and Technology 53.
52Davide Nicolini, ‘Medical Innovation as a Process of Translation: A Case from the Field of Telemedicine’
(2010) 21 British Journal of Management 1011.
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term appears across the health landscape.53 The regulatory framework gov-
erning ‘innovative treatments’54 in the UK is piecemeal.55 As with standard
medical treatments, NICE is charged with assessing whether innovative treat-
ments ought to be approved for NHS use. NICE issues guidelines which
inform decision-making within NHS Clinical Commissioning Groups
subject to each group’s priorities and discretion on the part of clinicians.
But further categories of access to ‘innovative treatments’ also exist. Compas-
sionate Use Programmes (CUPs)56 are designed to provide patients with life-
threatening illnesses early access to unproven interventions (unauthorised
medical products which have not yet received market authorisation).57 Such
access is typically limited to situations where no current treatment exists
and where individuals may not fit the clinical trial participation criteria. A
further avenue for accessing untested interventions is via ‘hospital exemp-
tions’ allowing for one-offmanufacturing of Advance Therapy Medicinal Pro-
ducts (ATMPs). These comprise of gene therapy medicinal products
(GTMPs), somatic cell therapy medicinal products (sCTMPs), tissue-engin-
eered products (TEPs) and combined ATMPs. Clinicians must apply to the
MHRA for a manufacturer licence to use the ATMP for a specific patient.58
Categorising innovation under each of these activities renders them subject
to distinct regulatory oversight with significant variation (and uncertainty)
around patients’ access to the innovation, acceptability of levels of risk-
benefit analysis, potential liability59 and requirements for evidence gather-
ing.60 In addition, different countries have different regulatory frameworks
for each type of innovation, a point of concern at a time of increased
medical tourism61 and growing internationalisation of research.62 For
example, there are internationally varying processes and standards for,
amongst others, Research Ethics Committees/Institutional Review Boards to
provide prior ethical review for compassionate use,63 use of autologous
53Shawn Harmon, ‘Responsible Regulation in Action? Responsible Research and Innovation and the Euro-
pean Bank for Induced Pluripotent Stem Cells’ (2018) Law, Innovation and Technology online first DOI:
10.1080/17579961.2018.1452175; Simms v Simms [2003] 2 WLR 1465.
54Definitional ambiguity associated with the term will be discussed further below.
55For discussion see Jean McHale’s contribution in this special issue.
56Also referred to as ‘expanded access’ schemes.
57Gayathri Balasubramanian and others, ‘An Overview of Compassionate Use Programs in the European
Union Member States’ (2016) 5(4) Intractable & Rare Diseases Research 244.
58MHRA: www.gov.uk/guidance/advanced-therapy-medicinal-products-regulation-and-licensing.
59Tsachi Keren-Paz and Alicia El Haj, ‘Liability Versus Innovation: The Legal Case for Regenerative Medicine’
(2014) Tissue Engineering Part A, 1 DOI: 10.1089/ten.tea.2013.0324; see also Tsachi Keren-Paz’s contri-
bution in this special issue.
60The latter includes the desirability of follow up by a research programme where the innovation was not
initially performed as research.
61Johanna Hanefeld, Richard Smith, and Thinakorn Noree, ‘Medical Tourism’ (2016) World Scientific Hand-
book of Global Health Economics and Public Policy 333.
62European Commission, Drivers of International Collaboration in Research (2009) EUR 24195 EN.
63Jan Borysowski, Hans-Jörg Ehni and Andrzej Górski, ‘Ethics Review in Compassionate Use’ (2017) 15 BMC
Medicine 136.
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stem cells64 and varying interpretations and applications across EU Member
States of the term ‘non-routine’ for the purposes of hospital exemptions.65
The complexity is exacerbated by additional terms associated with innovation,
for example ‘experimentation’, ‘experimental therapy’, ‘innovative treatment’
and ‘innovative therapy’.66
Some work has been dedicated to offering context-specific definitions of
medical innovation, including in the fields of surgery,67 autologous stem
cells68 and drug therapy.69 One common feature is departure from standard
treatment but the extent of departure required to warrant ‘innovation’
varies. For example, Section 2(2) of the Access to Medical Treatments (Inno-
vation) Act 201670 (‘AMTIA’) defines innovative medical treatment as
‘medical treatment for a condition that involves a departure from the existing
range of accepted medical treatments for the condition’. Such treatments, per
Section 3(2)(a) and (2)(b) include ‘amongst other things’ off-label use of auth-
orised medicinal products and medicinal products with no marketing author-
isation. Beyond these specifications and acknowledgement that innovation
can involve both processes and products, the Act offers little detail. Chan
suggests innovative treatment/therapy represents ‘significant departures
from standard medical therapy which has not been validated by reliable
research methods, or where there is simply insufficient evidence to support
the safety and efficacy of the innovative procedure, method, or device’.71
Another definition suggests that these are ‘uncontrolled, often single, inter-
ventions intended to manage or solve particular problems’ which are not
carried out in order to add to the stock of knowledge but primarily to
benefit the individual.72 It could be argued that these descriptions suggest
medical innovation is primarily directed at benefitting individual patients
and thus neatly falls under the category of practice/treatment, but this may
be because the terminology used i.e. innovative therapy, innovative treatment,
innovative practice already imply a practice/treatment-centric goal of individ-
ual benefit. But a counter implication is that research may be more aligned to
innovation on the basis of its contribution to the development of new knowl-
edge. Medical innovation is often the starting point upon a translational
64Tamra Lysaght and others, ‘Regulatory Challenges with Autologous Adult Stem Cells: A Comparative
Review of International Regulations’ (2017) 14 Bioethical Inquiry 261.
65House of Commons Science and Technology Committee Report, Regenerative Medicine 2016–2017 HC
275.
66For an extensive overview of the varying terminology in this area see Nicholas Pace, ‘The Regulation of
Innovation’, (PhD Thesis, Institute of Law and Financial Studies University of Glasgow 2005).
67Wendy Rogers and others, ‘Identifying Surgical Innovation: A Qualitative Study of Surgeons’ Views’
(2014) 259 Annals of Surgery 273.
68Lysaght and others (n 58).
69Aronson (n 49).
70Ch 9.
71Tracey Chan, ‘Legal and Regulatory Responses to Innovative Treatment’, (2013) 21(1)Medical Law Review
92. Emphasis added.
72Dale Cowan, ‘Innovative Therapy Versus Experimentation’ (1985) 169 Torts Ins L J 619, 623.
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continuum which, through on-going research and development,73 can lead to
the introduction and adoption of an innovation which may eventually become
a standard practice/treatment option.74 Thus innovation can straddle both
practice/treatment and research, ‘occupying a position somewhere between
“standard practice” and “clinical research”’.75 As I suggest further below,
innovation can, then, be conceived of as a space within which activities
focussed towards both individual and societal benefit can co-exist. Indeed,
normatively, this is what we would wish to happen. But how can we make
better sense of these overlapping spheres of action with interchanging
actors? It is here we find value in the anthropological concept of liminality.
Liminality is precisely concerned with spaces ‘in between’. In the next
section, I therefore explore how the concept can provide a helpful analytical
lens through which to explore those spaces occupied by medical innovation
and relatedly, practice/treatment and research.
4. Liminality, process and experience: achieving conceptual
clarity via blurring boundaries?
Further clarity around medical innovation could be achieved by offering more
specific and prescriptive descriptions of what each activity constitutes.
However, this could lead to added complication as the law’s tendency to cat-
egorise activities and objects of regulation is invariably challenged by, for
example, the rapid pace at which new technologies develop76 and new
objects of regulation are created. The effect of this tendency to categorise
has been characterised as regulatory compression: ‘a silo-based approach to
classifying research objects that: (1) limits the flexibility necessary in clinical
and laboratory research; and (2) results in the emergence of unregulated
spaces that lie between the bounded regulatory spheres’.77 Indeed, this categ-
orisation can often take place via the introduction of more rules which may
not always represent the most appropriate regulatory response.78 By exploring
how medical innovation might overlap with other categories of activity, such
as the practice/treatment-research divide, I am not suggesting that classifi-
cation and distinctions are not necessary or important, nor am I dismissing
the value of pre-existing definitions which have been offered in various
73Often but not exclusively in the form of clinical trials.
74Various versions of the translational continuum have been discussed. See for example Giulio Cossu and
others, ‘The Lancet Commission: Stem Cells and Regenerative Medicine’ (2018) 391(10123) The Lancet
883; Brian Drolet and Nancy Lorenzi, ‘Translational Research: Understanding the Continuum from
Bench to Bedside’ (2011) 157(1) Translational Research 1.
75Keren-Paz and El Haj (n 59).
76Lyria Bennett Moses, ‘Recurring Dilemmas: The Law’s Race to Keep Up with Technological Change’
(2007) 7 University of Illinois Journal of Law, Technology and Policy 239.
77Taylor-Alexander and others (n 14) 175.
78Nayha Sethi, ‘Reimagining Regulatory Approaches: On the Essential Role of Principles in Health Research
Regulation’ (2015) 12 SCRIPTed 91.
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contexts. Rather, an emphasis on overlap reveals areas of meaningful distinc-
tion and true differentiation between them and reduces the likelihood of the
over- and under-protection of different patients/participants’ rights fore-
warned by Kass and others. By emphasising overlap, we might also better
facilitate responsible innovation and ensure that appropriately-tailored safe-
guards are in place. In what follows, I suggest the anthropological concept
of liminality aids us in this endeavour. More specifically, it does so through
the emphasis it places on capturing process, experience and transformation
through and across thresholds of human experience. Building upon previous
contributions on the value of liminality in health research regulation, I suggest
that liminality provides a useful paradigm through which to explore medical
innovation, the areas of overlap with practice/treatment and research, and is
thereby a first step towards delivering more effective and responsible
regulation.
Laurie and others have advanced a framework for a processual approach to
health research regulation, grounded in the anthropological concept of ‘limin-
ality’.79 The term, derived from the Latin ‘limen’ meaning threshold, was
initially developed by anthropologist Arnold van Gennep in Rites of Passage
in which he draws upon various rituals from diverse cultures in order to
explain the human transformative process by which the status of an individual
morphs from one status to the other through the crossing of thresholds. The
archetypal example is transition from childhood to adulthood and associated
rituals related to that social change. Subsequent contributions from Victor
Turner in the 1960s built upon liminality, suggesting that it accounts for a
state of ‘in betweeness’ where an individual may simultaneously occupy
different liminal spaces i.e. both childhood and adulthood, or in fact, they
may stop at a space ‘betwixt and between’,80 occupying neither status. The
exact point at which this transformation may occur may not necessarily be
clear. Van Gennep identified three key stages within this process and
Turner built upon van Gennep’s identification as follows: (1) In the pre-
liminal phase, the individual is removed from their current status in society
– they experience a separation from previous practices and routines; (2)
during the liminal phase the individual is subject to certain rites or rituals con-
ducted ‘under the authority of a master of ceremonies’. The individual experi-
ences a change in identity; and this implies an actual passing through the
threshold that marks the boundary between two phases, the term ‘liminality’
was introduced in order to characterise this passage; and (3) in the post-
liminal phase the individual emerges with a different status, having undergone
a transformation, and is re-incorporated into society.
79Laurie (n 14); Taylor-Alexander and others (n 14); Agomoni Ganguli Mitra and others, ‘Reconfiguring
Social Value in Health Research Through the Lens of Liminality’ (2017) 31(2) Bioethics https://doi.org/
10.1111/bioe.12324.
80Victor Turner, Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure (Cornell University Press, 1969) 95.
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But what has this got to do with medical innovation? In building upon this
concept, Laurie and others (including this author) have outlined the under-
pinnings of liminality in relation to the value which it might bring to support-
ing actors navigating some of the ‘liminal spaces’ of health research
regulation.81 We suggest that liminality and a processual framework ‘chal-
lenges us to engage with the processual and experiential dynamics of research,
including the ways in which practices, people, and entities are affected by
regulation’.82 In particular, we emphasise the importance of capturing
different experiences of actors and processes involved in these spaces, perspec-
tives which, we argue, have hitherto been overlooked in regulatory approaches
to health research, being under or un-accounted for.83
Developing on these foundations, this article further contributes to the lit-
erature by suggesting that medical innovation represents one such liminal
space and that it is typified by multiple thresholds that must be successfully
crossed in order for the enterprise to be a success. As such, thinking with
liminality helps us to engage better with the processual and experiential
dynamics of medical innovation. In the discussion that follows, several
examples highlight the value which a liminal lens brings to better understand-
ing medical innovation. It should be noted that the intention is not to consider
in detail which regulatory mechanisms might most appropriately regulate
such activities. Rather, the value of this analysis lies in the assertion that in
order to effectively regulate activities (and select the most appropriate regulat-
ory mechanisms) we need to first understand the spaces which need to be
regulated and navigated. In particular, I suggest that liminality helps us to
identify an important, yet overlooked, feature of the medical innovation
terrain: its twin objectives concerned with both individual benefit (typically
stressed in the practice/treatment context) andwider societal benefit (typically
stressed in the research and medical innovation contexts). Thus, a further
contribution of this piece lies in highlighting how liminality helps us to under-
stand how we might support key actors in navigating across such complex
spaces. An integral component of such an approach lies in resisting law’s ten-
dency to automatically fixate upon further prescription and categorisation,
often in the form of legislative text. Rather, I suggest that an important first
step – provided by liminality – lies in moving from text to context. In other
words, whilst further regulation, including potential for new legislation or gui-
dance (text), may be necessary, this will only be effective to the extent that it
reflects the experiences of actors and the environments within which such
activities take place (context), and once it is well understood that existing
regulatory spaces are inadequate for the task at hand.
81Laurie (n 14); Taylor-Alexander and others (n 14); Ganguli-Mitra and others (n 79).
82Taylor-Alexander and others (n 14).
83Laurie (n 14).
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A pertinent aspect of liminality is its concern with transformation. Turner
defines this ‘ … as structuring and structured processes and experiences that
occur in institutionally delineated time-spaces’.84 Turner suggested that the
‘inter-structural’ represents an acknowledgement of ‘the coincidence of oppo-
site processes and notions’ and ‘that which is neither this nor that, and yet is
both’.85 In other words, two processes can simultaneously exist despite oppo-
sition. Within health research, consider the ways in which law constructs the
regulation of data and tissue (namely under the General Data Protection
Regulation86 and the Human Tissue Act 2004). These legal structures do
not reflect the realities that tissue is in fact, upon analysis, data. This suggests
that in regulation we tend to set up structures that seek an either/or labelling,
and thereby fail to reflect ontological coexistence of regulated subject matter
in the real world: i.e. research material can be both tissue and data at the same
time. There is some evidence in case law of a move towards recognising this
reality; S and Marper v UK87 recognised this relationship between DNA
samples and data (and privacy implications) in ways that legislation does
not necessarily do so. Indeed, the recently introduced General Data Protection
Regulation does not explicitly state that DNA constitutes data for the pur-
poses of the law. However, from a scientific perspective, the value arising
from DNA relies precisely on the potential to extract data from it. Thus,
these artificial and opposing structures which Turner observed are apparent
within health regulation.
Returning to an earlier example, while the traditional locus of the distinc-
tion between practice/treatment (benefit of the individual patient) is often set
up against research (the pursuit of generalisable knowledge), numerous
examples highlight the blurring distinctions between the two: medical inno-
vation is precisely an instance of these activities. Indeed, the field of regenera-
tive medicine and thoracic surgeon Paolo Macchiarini’s ‘failed experiments’
provide a stark example of the ambiguities surrounding classification and
the potential dangers of forcing these activities into rigid pre-existing regulat-
ory frameworks. It also illustrates the risks of such activities remaining insuffi-
ciently accounted for and as McHale puts it, ‘falling through the cracks’.88 A
Karolinska University Hospital-commissioned external inquiry (the Asplund
Report) suggested that the operations which involved transplantation of syn-
thetic tracheas developed by Macchiarini and his team were not categorised as
‘research’ and thus were not subject to procedures for research study ethics
approval at Karolinska. Rather, the local ethics committee considered them
84(n 80).
85Ibid 7.
86Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protec-
tion of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such
data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation).
87(2009) 48 EHRR.
88See Jean McHale’s contribution in this special issue.
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to constitute medical care ethics89 under compassionate use (i.e. medical
treatment for humanitarian reasons rather than research).90 This was so
despite the fact that the synthetic scaffolds used in the procedures were con-
sidered to be Advanced Therapy Medicinal Products, and thus subject to
approval requirements from the Swedish Medicinal Products Agency.91 The
Asplund Report concluded that had Macchiarini’s operations been correctly
classified as clinical research and subject to ethical review, it was ‘very unlikely
that the transplants would have been approved’.92 It is interesting to note that
the initial outcomes of the procedures were reported as research, including in
The Lancet93 which has now retracted two papers by Macchiarini and co-
authors, with reference to the fact that their research ‘constitutes scientific
misconduct’.94 Another external inquiry conducted by the Karolinska Insti-
tute University Board acknowledged the close connections between the activi-
ties carried out at the hospital and the research conducted at the University
which led to confusion. Again, the relative uncertainty around classification
of these activities illustrates howmedical innovation can be variously conceived
of as straddling both research and practice/treatment activities. Viewed in this
light, an approach inspired by the inter-structural nature of liminality enables
us to break down false/forced distinctions and explicitly acknowledge that mul-
tiple activities and intentions may coincide. The liminal lens makes more expli-
cit the reality that a given activity can bemore than one thing at once; this alerts
us to the dangers of regulatory silos. It also suggests we need more overt
systems for capturing this and for navigating multiple regulatory spaces at
the same time. I will use the database for innovative treatments, as envisioned
by s2(1) of AMTIA,95 to illustrate this point.
Miola considers in this issue the various challenges associated with the
establishment, maintenance and potential utility of any such register.
Despite the considerable uncertainties around it (including the fact that the
register has still to be established), the question of pursuing a register
through law provides an interesting example for liminality and its usefulness.
Liminality invites us to conceptualise medical innovation as a space which
breaks down pre-existing structures and in so doing our approach can
better accommodate the co-existence of overlapping activities. As mentioned
89Maureen McKelvey, Rögnvaldur Saemundsson and Olof Zaring, ‘A Recent Crisis in Regenerative Medi-
cine: Analyzing Governance in Order to Identify Public Policy Issues’ (2018) Science and Public Policy
scx085, https://doi.org/10.1093/scipol/scx085.
90Asplund (n 19).
91These approvals were not sought. See McKelvey and others (n 89).
92Asplund (n 19) [14].
93Phillip Jungebluth and others, ‘Tracheobronchial Transplantation with a Stem-Cell-Seeded Bioartificial
Nanocomposite: A Proof-of-Concept Study’ (2011) 378 The Lancet 1997.
94Editorial, ‘The Final Verdict on Paolo Macchiarini: Guilty of Misconduct’ (2018) 392(10141) The Lancet 2.
95(n 70). The Act, and its various controversial earlier incarnations including the Medical Innovation Bill
(Saatch Bill), are considered by José Miola’s contribution in this special issue, who takes a more critical
approach of the database than offered above.
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previously, practice/treatment and research are often differentiated based on
whether the primary intention of the activity is to benefit an individual or to
generate generalisable knowledge, ultimately leading to wider societal benefits.
Each activity triggers distinct regulatory pathways. But as the discussion has
demonstrated, this distinction is challenged by the practical realities associ-
ated with conducting such activities. A liminal approach that stresses the
importance of context and which actively engages with – and at times
embraces – anti-structure, allows us to destabilise such distinctions. It helps
us acknowledge that medical innovation is a space within which both aims
of individual benefit and contributing to the wider stock of knowledge can
co-exist. In practical terms, such a ‘shared space’ could be conceived of in
the form of a register (or other means of robustly capturing the outcomes
of innovation). A database could hold the results (positive and negative) of
individual responses to innovative interventions and at the same time allow
such results to be used to inform other prospective individual treatments as
well as further, more robust, study for the purpose of wider knowledge gen-
eration for societal benefit. Thus, simultaneously, a register can protect indi-
viduals (more information available to enrich consent about likely
outcomes from previous interventions) and promote new and responsible
innovation/research (deliver both a dynamic evidence base and a platform
on which to build future protocols).
The previous discussion demonstrates the clear relevance of ‘liminal
spaces’ to the medical innovation setting. It has also suggested how a
liminal approach might help us to accommodate such coincidence. But,
again, with its emphasis on context, liminality provides even further valuable
insights. An independent inquiry into regenerative medicine research – a field
where innovation is particularly prevalent96 – noted that contracts between
academics and NHS hospitals are commonplace in the UK and can exacerbate
the difficulties in determining how to classify processes. The panel explained:
with novel or experimental treatments, the boundaries between what should be
classified as academic activity and what should be classified as health service
related activity might become blurred. Coupled with this, there can be uncer-
tainty or ambiguity around which organisation’s governance framework
applies when activities span both (or indeed multiple) institutions.97
The report also suggested that added complexity lies in the fact that medicinal
products may also be manufactured, thus
the boundaries between academic research, manufacturing and clinical treatment
may become blurred, [further], where there are different governance structures
96Giulio Cossu and others, ‘The Lancet Commission: Stem Cells and Regenerative Medicine’ (2018) 391
(10123) The Lancet 883.
97Stephen Wigmore and others, Special Inquiry into Regenerative Medicine Research at UCL (September
2017) 9. www.ucl.ac.uk/news/news-articles/0917/Special_Inquiry_Final_Report_605109702_7_.pdf.
LAW, INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGY 17
within different organisations, different nomenclature in use, and different levels of
understanding of the quality and regulatory requirements between different part-
ners, then communication and end to end oversight might be compromised.98
Yet another report exploring the Karolinska University relationship with
Macchiarini found that ‘collaboration confused the division of responsibilities
between the university and the hospital, not least the responsibility for ensur-
ing that the required permits were obtained.’.99 The changing (and confusing)
environment in which such activities take place is of concern elsewhere; in the
United States Klein and Fleischman note that ‘the pharmaceutical industry
has turned to commercially oriented networks of physicians practicing in
private offices’.100 Thus, liminality can encourage us to look beyond regu-
lation alone, and to account for the nature of employment of actors involved
in ‘innovating’ across and between different structures occupying the inno-
vation landscape. Again, it helps us to move from text to context. We must
also consider, as Chan has noted, ‘the shifting relationships between different
stakeholder groups, the global politics of research and innovation, and the
evolving role of publics and patients with respect to science’.101
These inter-structural spaces which actors must navigate also imply the
potential for transformation across different thresholds; such boundary cross-
ings are experiences which liminality encourages us to account for. For
example, the medical professional may ‘transform’ from ’clinician’ responsible
for direct care whose primary concerns relate to the best interests of the indi-
vidual patient to ’investigator’ who is first and foremost – but not exclusively –
preoccupied with knowledge production and scientific rigour outlined within
a research protocol; it may not necessarily be clear at which point this trans-
formation takes place. Similar challenges appear in the public health emer-
gency setting where the pressure to innovate may be particularly pressing.
Questions arise as to whether first responders are acting in the capacity of
humanitarian workers or researchers.102 The former role implies that the pri-
ority activity is practice/treatment as opposed to the researcher priority of
knowledge generation. Relatedly, the individual who seeks medical treatment
from her physician may suddenly ‘morph’ into a research participant – poten-
tially unaware or confused about how participation might affect her treatment
and the possibility of not receiving the best available treatment (if she receives
98Ibid 16.
99Sten Heckscher, Ingrid Carlberg and Carl Gahmberg, ‘Karolinksa Institutet and the Macchiarini Case.
Summary in Swedish and English’, (2016) https://ki.se/sites/default/files/karolinska_institutet_and_
the_macchiarini_case_summary_in_english_and_swedish.pdf.
100Jason Klein and Alan Fleischman, ‘The Private Practicing Physician-Investigator: Ethical Implications of
Clinical Research in the Office Setting’ (2002) 32 Hastings Center Report 22.
101Sarah Chan, ‘Current and Emerging Global Themes in the Bioethics of Regenerative Medicine: The
Tangled Web of Stem Cell Translation’ (2017) 12(7) Regenerative Medicine 839.
102Agomoni Ganguli Mitra and Nayha Sethi, ‘Conducting Research in the Context of Global Health Emer-
gencies: Identifying Key Ethical and Governance Issues’ (Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2016).
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any treatment at all). When we introduce market considerations, important
ethical issues around the patient-participant-consumer also emerge.103 Fur-
thermore, given the rise in patient participation, there may be instances
where the research team joins the patient-participant as a co-investigator,104
thus performing various roles and crossing various regulatory thresholds
depending on their activity. Likewise, as considered earlier, the researcher,
having worked on the assumption that her obligations are limited to answer-
ing a research hypothesis by virtue of incidental findings, may now find
herself performing a role more closely in tune with someone responsible
for the patients’ clinical care. When we stop to reflect upon the experiences
of these actors, it becomes apparent that we must better account for this
duality of roles and support actors as they navigate these complex regulatory
landscapes. Elsewhere, colleagues have examined the ways in which a liminal
approach can assist in recasting the notion of social value in research. Core
components of this are precisely focussed on engaging with the experiences
of actors across the regulatory research endeavour, and iterative collaboration
amongst actors in developing new governance frameworks. The authors stress
the importance of incorporating feedback loops which reflect the experiences
of actors on the ground (such as researchers) and their subsequent incorpor-
ation within regulation.105 In the medical innovation context, this could be
achieved through conducting more empirical research with the variety of sta-
keholders involved in doing, experiencing and regulating innovation. In turn,
this would involve explicitly folding-in these experiences, within current regu-
latory responses. One way of doing so, as I have argued elsewhere, is through
the inclusion of best-practice alongside pre-existing (often overly abstract)
guidance. This provides an important means of supporting decision-makers
in interpreting guidance through the use of concrete examples which reflect
practical experiences of those actors charged with navigating the regulatory
framework.106
In the medical innovation setting, some helpful insights from pre-existing
empirical work (and which could be reflected within regulatory frameworks)
merit consideration. For example, in the context of surgical innovation, it is
suggested that there is lack of agreement about which procedures are con-
sidered innovative107 (in contrast with ‘variations in practice’ and ‘research’).
Pace stresses the importance of differentiating between experimental inno-
vation (where a ‘completely new intervention is being attempted’) and
103Chan (n 101).
104See Michelle Robbins, Janice Tufte and Clarissa Hsu, ‘Learning to “Swim” with the Experts: Experiences
of Two Patient Co-investigators for a Project Funded by the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Insti-
tute’ (2016) 20(2) The Permanente Journal 88.
105Ganguli Mitra and others (n 79).
106Nayha Sethi, ‘Research and Global Health Emergencies: On the Essential Role of Best Practice (2018)
Public Health Ethics phy014 https://doi.org/10.1093/phe/phy014
107Rogers and others (n 67).
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personal innovation (where ‘the proposed technique has already been estab-
lished but the practitioner concerned has either never attempted it before or is
still learning how to perform it’).108 Interviews conducted by Rogers and
others with surgeons reveal that first time attempts of a pre-existing technique
may or may not constitute innovation to those performing them.109 Rogers
and others also found that surgeons lacked consensus around the relationship
between research and innovation with some interviewees suggesting that
innovation is a type of research, some suggesting they are quite separate
activities, some describing research as preceding innovation and others sup-
porting the reverse.110 Further, there may be an unwillingness amongst sur-
geons to categorise their activities as ‘innovative’ due to the associated
regulatory oversight, with tendency to label activities as ‘research’ for the pur-
poses of publication.111 It is important to consider whether difficulties in deli-
neation arise due to a gap between stated intention (to benefit a patient) and
true intention (advancing research whilst avoiding a potentially tougher regu-
latory framework).112 Likewise, particularly in the context of academic clini-
cians/researchers, the pressures of a publish or perish culture must also be
considered. Additionally, Hutchison and others stress that leaving it up to sur-
geons to determine whether or not their activities constitute ‘innovation’ has
substantial implications for patient safety: ‘patients are exposed to risks, with
sometimes tragic consequences’.113
One final aspect of liminality might assist us in avoiding the risks associ-
ated with leaving categorisation of activities to the discretion of one individ-
ual, team or institution. Liminality suggests that transformation often takes
place under the authority of a ‘Master of Ceremonies’ (MoCs) or ‘Represen-
tative of Order’ (RoO). In human societies it is common that actors (for
example, priests, shamen, village elders) are charged with overseeing rituals
(e.g. christenings, marriages, tribe initiations) and in guiding the individual
across thresholds, as they undergo transformation.114 In the health research
regulation context, I have argued with colleagues elsewhere that there are par-
allels to be found in the notion of regulatory stewardship.115 Examples of
regulatory stewardship in action include NHS Research Ethics Committees
108Pace (n 60).
109Rogers and others (n 67).
110Ibid.
111Angelique Reitsma and Jonathan Moreno, ‘Ethics of Innovative Surgery: U.S. Surgeons’ Definitions,
Knowledge and Attitudes’ (2005) 200(1) Journal of the American College of Surgeons 103.
112See Tsachi Keren-Paz’s contribution in this special issue.
113Katrina Hutchison and others, ‘Getting Clearer about Surgical Innovation: A New Definition and a New
Tool to Support Responsible Practice’ (2015) 262(6) Annals of Surgery 949.
114Arpad Szakolczai, ‘Liminality and Experience: Structuring Transitory Situations and Transformative
Events’ in Agnes Hovarth, Bjørn Thomassen and Harald Wydra (eds), Breaking Boundaries: Varieties of
Liminality (Berghahn Books 2015) 18.
115Graeme Laurie and others, ‘Charting Regulatory Stewardship in Health Research: Making the Invisible
Visible’, (2018) 27 (2) Cambridge Healthcare Quarterly 333.
20 N. SETHI
and HRA Application Managers.116 These bodies guide researchers through
the regulatory landscape. Turning to the context of medical innovation, a
role for regulatory stewards might lie in the creation of individual roles or
teams tasked with supporting individuals in determining whether activities
ought to be categorised under practice/treatment, research and/or innovation.
Such actors could work alongside regulators and outwith the institutions
within which the activities are taking place. Regulatory stewards might also
be involved in the establishment and maintenance of a register of medical
innovations, advising on data capture and facilitating sharing arrangements.
These are only preliminary illustrations, as more work is needed in both
developing the notion of regulatory stewardship and exploring the legal
avenue of creating a register of medical innovation. But, true to the lessons
from liminality, the law alone cannot provide such benefits, humans must
be led through processes of transition and change.117 This analysis offers us
helpful starting points in developing a more holistic conceptualisation of
medical innovation and in understanding how we can better support actors
as they attempt to navigate their way across these sites of transformation
and blurred boundaries.
5. Conclusion
This article has highlighted the pressing need to develop a more holistic con-
ceptualisation of medical innovation in order to be better able to determine
which regulatory approaches might be appropriate to govern such activities.
It has asked if, and how, the anthropological concept of liminality might
serve to enrich our understanding of medical innovation and by consequence,
the relationships between innovation, practice/treatment and research. Some
challenges in developing a satisfactory definition of medical innovation centre
around the need to simultaneously distinguish it from research and practice/
treatment whilst also to accommodate areas of overlap between all three – this
challenge has not yet received the attention it deserves. Further, a liminal
approach allows us to engage with the inter-structural dynamics at play as
an alternative to law’s tendency to categorise and silo activities, creating
false and unhelpful distinctions. Liminality also invites us to account for
the experiences of processes, actors and things involved in medical inno-
vation; the examples provided demonstrate that many such aspects that
shape medical innovation are under or un-accounted for within pre-existing
conceptualisations, presenting significant challenges for regulation. Important
synergies also emerge between liminality’s preoccupation with transformation,
116Ibid.
117As the work on liminality has shown, a dynamic continuum – informed by liminality and in particular its
preoccupation with thresholds – offers a helpful conceptual device through which to explore these tran-
sitions. Space limits prevent me from elaborating on dynamic continuum here.
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and the various changes of status that are evident across the medical innovation
landscape. By these means, the discussion has highlighted the pressing need for
further work, both empirical and conceptual, in order to better understand the
activities we seek to regulate.
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